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I. INTRODUCTION 
Fifty years from now people will look back and remember the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century as a time of technological ad-
vancement in the realm of information technology.  In the last thirty 
years, engineers have created computer technology beyond what was 
ever thought possible.  Companies like Google, Apple, Microsoft, and 
IBM have changed the way people access information in their everyday 
lives.  For instance, an individual can use Google’s map application to 
navigate his or her way around anywhere in the world.  While the ability 
to use navigation technology to travel around the United States may not 
seem like much of an accomplishment, now, navigation technology has 
become so advanced that you can use it to find your way around some 
the world’s most exotic, obscure, and remote locations.  For example, 
you can use Google maps to travel the busy streets of Chandni Chowk 
in Delhi, India or to find a restaurant in Agua Calientes, Peru before 
making your way to Machu Picchu.  As our ability to connect with others 
around the world has become more and more simplified, globalization 
has become the norm. 
Advancements in technology have led to theories concerning how 
humans will adjust to change. Author and inventor, Ray Kurzweil, has 
long toyed around with the idea that society is near the point of singular-
ity.1 Kurzweil predicts the point of singularity will occur after computer 
technology has advanced to exceed human intelligence.2  He wrote a 
book3 on the implications of this transformation.  He believes “our bod-
ies will evolve as much as our machines,” so much so, that a clear sepa-
ration between the two will no longer exist.4  According to Kurzweil, 
humans will be able to slow down aging processes, and neural implants 
will be able to extend human intelligence.5  In 2006, he estimated the 
point of singularity would occur in forty-nine years.6   
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 1. Robert Levine, The New Human: Our Singular Future, Interview with Ray Kurzweil, 
PLAYBOY, July 2006, at 55. The meaning of singularity depends on context. In the context of 
historical singularity, the point of singularity refers to the point “at which civilization would 
fundamentally be transformed.”  Id. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See generally RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR (2005). 
 4. Levine, supra note 1, at 55. 
 5. Id. at 56. 
 6. Id. at 55. 
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While it is too early to conclude whether Kurzweil’s theories con-
cerning the point of singularity7 will materialize, technology is already 
heading in that direction.  Recently Three Square Market, a technology 
company, teamed up with Biohax, a company specializing in implanta-
ble microchips, to implement a voluntary microchip program for em-
ployees.8  Technology is being used to help people with disabilities.  Neil 
Harbisson, a colorblind man, had a sensory antenna implanted into his 
brain in 2004 to allow him to listen to colors.9  He is now a wildly suc-
cessful advocate for cyborg technology.10   
On the surface it appears that technology, and with it, society, is 
advancing rather quickly.  But in reality, this cannot be further from the 
truth.  Discussions concerning the rapid pace of technological advance-
ment ignore the fact that solutions to real problems have yet to be found.  
This may be due to the fact that the masterminds capable of solving com-
plex problems lack a sufficient financial incentive to undertake such 
tasks.  As technology continues to advance, we cannot continue to ignore 
real problems.  Doing so will cause us to become a society capable of 
creating ‘cool things’ like artificial intelligence and human cyborgs, but 
also one that is unable to protect citizens from harm.  One problem that 
has yet to be resolved is the problem of “space junk,” aka orbital debris.  
No feasible long term solutions have been found to remove space junk 
from orbit.  Without a solution, space junk will endanger future advance-
ments in space technology by inhibiting future space exploration.  Here, 
the following note is concerned with man-made space debris orbiting the 
earth that presents a risk to human life and property, including risk of 
damage to spacecrafts and other space structures. 
First, the background section will provide definitions and infor-
mation necessary to understand the problem presented by orbital debris.  
Second, the issue section identifies the legal problem as a lack of national 
and international laws and treatises addressing space debris removal.  
Third, the analysis section will discuss the current national and interna-
tional response to space debris.  Fourth, the proposal section will discuss 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Maggie Astor, Microchip Implants for Employees? One Company Says Yes, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/technology/microchips-wis-
consin-company-employees.html. Employees have the option of getting a microchip the size 
of a grain of rice implanted between their thumb and index finger. Once implanted, the mi-
crochip allows employees to pay for food and enter the office building by waiving their hand 
in front of a sensor. Id. 
 9. See Neil Harbisson, I Listen to Color, TED GLOBAL (June 2012), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/neil_harbisson_i_listen_to_color?language=en#. 
 10. Id. 
392 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:59 
maritime law of salvage as a possible solution to the space debris prob-
lem.  Lastly, the conclusion section will provide a brief summary of the 
issues discussed.   
II. BACKGROUND 
After decades of launching satellites and space aircrafts into outer 
space, we have created a problem that poses a potential danger to human 
life, property, and future attempts of space exploration.  The danger 
posed by space debris cannot be overstated.  Space debris has endan-
gered the International Space Station and human lives.11  Without an ef-
fort to remove space debris from orbit, this problem and the safety risks 
posed by space debris are likely to continue to grow.  Currently, NASA 
is tracking 500,000 pieces of debris orbiting the earth.12   
A. What Is Space Junk? 
Space junk can be one of two things: it is nonfunctional debris that 
is either composed of natural particles (meteor) or artificial man-made 
particles.13  While natural particles orbit around the sun, man-made de-
bris orbits the earth.14  Space junk is formally referred to as orbital de-
bris.15  These man-made particles are often composed of “nonfunctional 
spacecrafts, abandoned launch vehicle stages, mission-related debris, 
and fragmentation debris.”16  The primary sources of space debris in 
Earth’s orbit usually fall under one of two categories: (1) “accidental and 
intentional break-ups which produce long-lived debris,” and (2) “debris 
released intentionally during the operation of launch vehicle orbital 
stages and spacecraft.”17  Thus, human missions to explore outer space 
are largely responsible for orbital debris.  It is a man- made problem that 
has yet to be resolved or adequately addressed.18   
 
 
 
 11. See Space Debris and Human Spacecraft, NASA (Sept. 26, 2013), 
https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html (last updated Aug. 7, 
2017). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Comm. On the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of 
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. DOC. ST/SPACE/49, at 1 (2010), 
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_49E.pdf [hereinafter UNOOSA]. 
 18. See id. (orbital debris created by collisions are expected to be remain a source of 
space debris in the future.). 
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B. Danger To Space Structures, Human Life, and Property Presented 
By Orbital Debris 
While orbital debris seems of little or no cause for concern, it poses 
a potential danger to the International Space Station and virtually all 
space vehicles launched into outer space, including satellites.19  Even 
though 500,000 pieces of debris are being tracked, there are millions of 
pieces of debris that are simply too small to track.20  The potential risk 
of damage should not be underestimated—even tiny paint flecks can, 
and have, damaged spacecrafts.21  Flying paint flecks are known to have 
caused damage to space shuttle windows.22 This is because debris travels 
at high velocity in outer space.  A tiny piece of space debris can travel 
up to speeds of 17,500 mph.23  Space debris has caused damage to sev-
eral space structures.24  There are several instances in recent history 
where space debris has caused damage to satellites.25  It is important to 
note that every collision between space debris and a functional space-
craft creates more debris and exacerbates the problem.26   
In 1996, pieces of an old French rocket hit and damaged a French 
satellite.27  China destroyed an old weather satellite and added more than 
3,000 pieces of space debris in 2007, which is suspected of having 
caused damage to other spacecrafts.28  Again in 2009, an United States 
Iridium commercial satellite was destroyed by a defunct Russian satel-
lite.  The satellites collided and created over 2,000 pieces of trackable 
space debris.29  Fragments do not need to be large in order to cause sig-
nificant damage.  Orbital debris fragments that are between one and ten 
cm in size are big enough to “penetrate and damage most spacecraft[s] 
and could possibly destroy space assets.”30  If a spacecraft is hit by a 
 
 19. Space Debris and Human Spacecraft, supra note 11.   
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.   
 24. Id. 
 25. Space Debris and Human Spacecraft, supra note 11.   
 26. Id. (in 2007 and 2009, in two separate incidents, collisions between satellites created 
a total of over 5,000 fragments of debris). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, DEP’T OF DEFENSE, BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
SYSTEM (BDMS): PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, at K318 (2007), 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a515713.pdf [hereinafter PROGRAMMATIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT]. See Space Debris: Hypervelocity Impacts and Pro-
tecting Spacecraft, EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Opera-
tions/Space_Debris/Hypervelocity_impacts_and_protecting_spacecraft. See also Center for 
Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies: Space Debris Basics, THE AEROSPACE CORP., 
https://aerospace.org/cords [hereinafter Space Degree Basics]. 
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piece of orbital debris, it will cause the spacecraft’s satellite function to 
be terminated, and will in turn create a “significant amount of small de-
bris.”31  Collisions can cause dangerous debris clouds, which consist of 
a concentration of debris particles or fragments.32  The probability of 
damage to a functioning spacecraft or satellite is likely to increase by 
debris clouds. 
C. Orbital Debris Re-entry Into Earth’s Atmosphere 
In addition to potential damage to satellites and other space vehi-
cles, there is also the possibility of re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere.33 
According to the Aerospace Corporation’s re-entry statistics, over 5,400 
metric tons of materials have survived re-entry over the last fifty years.34   
Most satellites vaporize or melt as they get closer to Earth’s atmos-
phere.35  As a satellite enters Earth’s atmosphere, compression and fric-
tion generates heat.36  Upon re-entry, orbital debris can travel at high 
velocity upwards of 29,000km/hr.37  The heat generated by travelling at 
such high speeds can melt or sometimes vaporize an entire satellite—
similar to the way meteors burn during a meteor shower.38  While most 
satellites burn completely, this is not always the case; some may survive 
reentry.39   
During reentry, the object decelerates rapidly and is subjected to 
atmospheric pressure which causes it to break apart.40  As an object goes 
through “denser regions of the atmosphere,” the velocity and tempera-
ture decreases, causing it to impact the ground at a lower speed.41  Be-
cause “drag on the object is directly proportional to atmospheric density, 
and atmospheric density varies greatly at high altitudes,” it is difficult to 
determine exactly where debris will land.42  Fortunately, there have been 
 
 31. PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 30 at L4-L5. 
See also Space Degree Basics, supra note 30. 
 32. Danger: Orbital Debris, THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION (May 4, 2018), https://aer-
ospace.org/story/danger-orbital-debris. 
 33. Center for Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies: Spacecraft Reentry, THE AEROSPACE 
CORP., formerly available at http://www.aerospace.org/cords/research/ (last visited Jan. 18, 
2018) (on file in Law Review Office) [hereinafter Spacecraft Reentry]. 
 34. Id.   
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. See also John Leslie, Does Space Junk Fall From The Sky?, NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/content/does-space-
junk-fall-sky. 
 37. Spacecraft Reentry, supra note 33. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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some advancements to prevent injury to people on Earth.43  Some satel-
lites are now equipped with rocket motors that allow the satellite to 
reenter a desired area.44  Surprisingly, there is only one reported incident 
of a person being struck by debris from a reentering satellite.45  However, 
it is likely that several incidents have not been reported.46 
However, not all objects that reenter are capable of being tracked 
and propelled to a desired location.  According to reentry data, over the 
last fifty years, 5,400 metric tons of materials have survived reentry.47  
The Russian Mir Space Station is the largest object to reenter, weighing 
at 120,000 kg.48  Over fifty debris objects have been recovered and doc-
umented.49  On January 22, 1997, a “250-kg stainless steel tank, a 30-kg 
pressure sphere, and a 45-kg thrust chamber” were recovered after 
reentry.50  Pieces of debris that survive reentry tend to be large and 
heavy, and pose a threat to people and property.51   
Additionally, pieces of debris that survive reentry create a “debris 
footprint.”52  A debris footprint is an area on the ground containing all 
debris pieces, including small untracked pieces.53  The width of a debris 
footprint typically range from twenty to forty km.54  While serious inju-
ries resulting from re-entry have not been reported and the risk of being 
injured is relatively low in comparison to the hazards humans face daily, 
a likelihood of harm to persons and property on Earth still exists given 
the growing quantity of debris currently in orbit and the width of a debris 
footprint.55 
D. Mitigation As The Current National and International Response To 
Orbital Debris 
While orbital debris is recognized as a serious threat by the national 
and international community, enacting policies that carry the force of 
law has proven to be difficult in a neutral zone like outer space.  The 
international community’s response to rising levels of orbital debris has 
 
 43. Spacecraft Reentry, supra note 33. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Spacecraft Reentry, supra note 33. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Spacecraft Reentry, supra note 33. 
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been to adopt mitigation measures to minimize the creation of future or-
bital debris.56  The implementation of mitigation measures are recom-
mended but are rarely legally required.57  The failure to enact policies 
that require members to act is surprising given that orbital debris can 
damage spacecrafts, lead to the loss of a mission, or the loss of life in 
cases where a spacecraft is manned.58   
In the context of manned spacecrafts, the dangers posed by orbital 
debris invoke a sense of urgency and demand a response from policy-
makers.  Finding a solution to issues presented by orbital debris becomes 
“highly relevant due to crew safety implications.”59  Perhaps this is why 
the international community responded by adopting mitigation guide-
lines.  While mitigation guidelines are insufficient to solve the problem, 
they provide guidance for reducing orbital debris moving forward.  In 
the early history of space exploration, nations were free to launch objects 
into Earth’s orbit without guidance or deference to mitigation proce-
dures.60  It was not until the mid 1990’s that the UN Office for Outer 
Space Affairs, considered the issue of space debris.61 Previously, space-
craft designers were not encouraged to consider mitigation procedures.62  
Now, design efforts have been prompted by “the recognition of the threat 
posed” by orbital debris.63  These measures can be divided into two ap-
proaches: (1) “those that curtail the generation of potentially harmful 
space debris in the near term,” and (2) “those that limit their generation 
over the long term.”64 The first approach involves the “curtailment of the 
production of mission-related space debris and the avoidance of break-
ups.”65  The second approach concerns “end-of-life procedures that re-
move decommissioned spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages from 
regions populated by operational spacecraft.”66 
Mitigation guidelines apply only to mission planning and the oper-
ation of newly designed spacecrafts.67  In formulating the basis for miti-
gation guidelines, prior incidents are often evaluated and used to prevent 
 
 56. UNOOSA, supra note 17. 
 57. See id. at 2 (stating “[t]hese guidelines are applicable to mission planning and the 
operation of newly designed spacecraft and orbital stages and, if possible, to existing ones.  
They are not legally binding under international law.”). 
 58. Id. at 1. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. at iii. 
 62. See UNOOSA, supra note 17 at 2. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 2. 
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reoccurrence.68  For example, in the past, malfunctions have led to frag-
mentation.69  Mitigation methods may involve planning for potential sce-
narios where malfunction occurs in order to prepare for a particular event 
and reduce the probability of a “catastrophic” event.70  Some mitigation 
methods address past accidental collisions by limiting the probability of 
an accident by estimating the likelihood of a collision with known ob-
jects during the “system’s launch phase and orbital lifetime.”71  This is 
important because studies have shown that the primary source of new 
space debris is likely to come from accidental collisions.72   
Some international organizations have responded by adopting col-
lision avoidance procedures that require an analysis of existing data.73  
Another mitigation method calls for the depletion of a spacecraft’s stored 
energy at the end of a mission.74  This method addresses the uninten-
tional fragmentation of spacecrafts that arise from collisions involving 
abandoned spacecrafts that were decommissioned while still containing 
a significant amount of stored energy.75  Passivation, a method of energy 
depletion, has been very effective.76  Passivation requires “the removal 
of all forms of stored energy, including residual propellants and com-
pressed fluids and the discharge of electrical storage devices.”77  Mitiga-
tion procedures prevent the creation of future orbital debris but do not 
address removal of existing debris.  The enactment of mitigation guide-
lines by the international community, while not sufficient to solve the 
problem of orbital debris, offers hope and encouragement that a multi-
lateral solution is possible.   
III. ISSUE 
While mitigation efforts are encouraging and important in address-
ing the problem of orbital debris, they fail to address the removal of ex-
isting debris from orbit.  All national and international treaties and guide-
lines addressing the problem of orbital debris have only set forth 
preventative measures that reduce the amount of debris, but they do not 
entirely eliminate it.  A spacecraft following every mitigation guideline 
set forth above, will still create a substantial amount of debris.  Given 
 
 68. See UNOOSA, supra note 17 at 2. 
 69. Id. at 3. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. UNOOSA, supra note 17 at 3. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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that it is impossible to entirely eliminate orbital debris through mitiga-
tion and given that levels of orbital debris will continue to rise, a solution 
that addresses the removal of debris from orbit is necessary.  Attempts 
to address this problem have failed largely because current efforts are 
geared towards mitigation.  Current space law fails to address removal 
of debris and does not provide a mechanism to encourage innovation and 
technology. The proceeding section takes a close look at current national 
and international approaches to addressing orbital debris.   
IV. ANALYSIS 
Currently, governmental agencies and organizations address the 
problem of orbital debris through mitigation procedures and data-sharing 
agreements.  However, none are focused towards encouraging innova-
tion in removal technology, and the majority are voluntary.78  For in-
stance, NASA has procedural requirements for limiting orbital debris79 
and orbital debris mitigation standard practices.80  The Department of 
Defense has made substantial steps by enacting a data-sharing agreement 
to address threats to spacecrafts.81  Furthermore, the Inter-Agency Space 
Debris Committee has devised a data sharing agreement with other coun-
tries in order to advance research concerning orbital debris.82  An analy-
sis of the current national and international approaches to addressing or-
bital debris is necessary to understanding the need for a different 
approach.   
A. National Response to Space Junk 
President Obama addressed the issue of orbital debris in the Na-
tional Space Policy of 2010.83  The Policy directed NASA and the De-
partment of Defense to “pursue research and development of technolo-
gies and techniques…to mitigate and remove on-orbit debris…,”84 
 
 78. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 79. NPR 8715.6A, NASA PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LIMITING ORBITAL 
DEBRIS AND EVALUATING THE METEOROID AND ORBITAL DEBRIS ENVIRONMENTS, NASA 
(Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/npr_8715_006b_.pdf [herein-
after NASA PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS: NPR 8715.6B]. 
 80. U.S. GOVERNMENT ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES, 
ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM OFFICE, NASA (2001), https://www.orbitalde-
bris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/usg_od_standard_practices.pdf [hereinafter U.S. MITIGATION 
STANDARD PRACTICES]. 
 81. See infra Section IV.A.3. 
 82. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 83. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT (June 28, 2010), https://history.nasa.gov/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf 
[hereinafter NATIONAL SPACE POLICY]. 
 84. Debris Remediation, ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM OFFICE, NASA, https://www.or-
bitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/remediation/. 
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however, this portion of the Policy was never implemented and the di-
rective has been removed from the White House website.85  There is cur-
rently no government entity in the United States that has been assigned 
the task of removing orbital debris.86  The current national response to 
the orbital debris issue involves mitigation procedures and data sharing 
agreements.  
 The failure to assign a government entity the task of removing or-
bital debris is not surprising.  The task is complex and the financial costs 
are high. However, finding a solution to the issue of orbital debris has 
become more important than ever.  On December 11, 2017, President 
Donald Trump renewed the United States’ interest in space exploration 
by issuing a Presidential Policy Directive, amending the National Space 
Policy, calling for human expansion into outer space.87  Notably, the Di-
rective declares that the United States is to: 
[l]ead an innovative and sustainable program of exploration with 
commercial and international partners to enable human expansion 
across the solar system and to bring back to Earth new knowledge 
and opportunities.  Beginning with missions beyond low-Earth orbit, 
the United States will lead the return of humans to the Moon for 
long-term exploration and utilization, followed by human missions 
to Mars and other destinations.88   
When taken seriously, the Directive indicates future space missions 
will involve placing humans in outer space for long periods of time.  If 
the problem of space debris is not adequately addressed, it will not only 
be satellites and expensive machinery at peril, but human lives.   
1. United States Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices 
In 2001, the United States government formalized efforts to address 
the issue of orbital debris in a set of guidelines developed by NASA and 
the Department of Justice entitled “Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard 
Practices” (ODMSP).89  The ODMSP lists four main objectives, and for 
each objective the ODMSP outlines specific mitigation guidelines aimed 
 
 85. See NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, supra note 83. 
 86. Debris Remediation, supra note 84. 
 87. Memorandum on Reinvigorating America’s Human Space Exploration Program, 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS., 2017 DCPD NO. 00902 (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-reinvigorating-
americas-human-space-exploration-program/. 
 88. Id. 
 89. U.S. MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES, supra note 80. See Letter from Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, Exec. Office of the President, to the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/08-14-17-OSTP-Orbital-Debris-Report.pdf. 
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at accomplishing the particular objective.  The ODMSP objectives and 
guidelines are as follows: 
(1) Objective One: “control of debris released during normal opera-
tions” by requiring “programs and projects” to “assess and limit the 
amount of debris released in planned manner during normal opera-
tions,”90  The objective is fulfilled by designing crafts that “eliminate 
or minimize debris released during normal operations.”91   
(2) Objective Two: “minimizing debris generated by accidental ex-
plosions” by requiring “programs and projects” to “assess and limit 
the probability of accidental explosion during and after completion 
of mission operations,”92  To fulfill the objective, the guidelines re-
quire a demonstration that the craft design is unlikely to cause an 
accidental explosion during a mission, and by depleting stored en-
ergy after the completion of a mission.93 
(3) Objective Three: “selection of safe flight profile and operational 
configuration[s]” by requiring “programs and projects” to “assess 
and limit the probability of operating space systems becoming a 
source of debris by collisions with man-made objects or meteor-
oids,”94  To avoid collisions during the orbital lifetime of the craft, 
the guidelines require an estimation and probability assessment to be 
conducted during the development stages.95 In order to avoid colli-
sions with small pieces of orbital debris, spacecraft designs must 
consider and “limit the probability that collisions with debris… will 
cause loss of control.”96   
(4) Objective Four: “postmission disposal of space structures” by 
implementing the use of “[p]rograms and projects” to plan for “cost 
effective disposal procedures for launch vehicle[s]” at the end of 
mission life in order to “minimize impact on future space opera-
tions.”97  The objective requires one of three post-mission disposal 
methods: atmospheric reentry, maneuvering to a storage orbit, or di-
rect retrieval.98   
 
 90. U.S. MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES, supra note 80. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id.  (“[i]n developing the design of a spacecraft or upper stage, each program, via 
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The fourth objective of the mitigation standards outlines three 
methods of disposal.  The ODMSP seems to allow atmospheric re-entry 
into the atmosphere so long as “the risk of human casualty” is less than 
1 in 10,000.99  The atmospheric reentry option allows a spacecraft to stay 
in orbit until it travels to another orbit or until it reenters the Earth’s at-
mosphere.100  In cases where the structure is fitted with a drag enhance-
ment, the drag device must not cause the structure to fragment in the 
event that a collision occurs while the object remains in orbit.101  A drag 
enhancement is used to reduce the time the object will remain in orbit.102  
This guideline is intended to reduce the possibility of creating orbital 
debris by prohibiting the use of drag enhancement devices that may frag-
ment or cause another spacecraft to fragment as it is decaying.103  While 
this measure is justifiable and progressive in terms of its goals, the per-
missible risk to human life (1 in 10,000) that it allows is baffling and 
indicative of excessive risk taking.104   
The option to maneuver a structure to a storage orbit allows a space 
structure to be relocated to a “storage regime.”105  The ODMSP charac-
terizes storage regimes by their altitude and emphasizes the need to use 
maneuvers that will not leave the structure near an operational orbit.106  
The goal here is to remove the structure from an operational orbit regime 
and into a designated area where it will no longer pose a threat.107  How-
ever, this option is problematic.  Using a storage orbit as a dumping site 
for orbital debris will preclude any future plans to make use of these 
orbits in a “more productive manner.”108  The direct retrieval option re-
quires the retrieval and removal of a structure from orbit at some time 
after the completion of a mission.109  The ODMSP requires the removal 
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of a structure when it becomes practical to do so,110 but it does not pro-
vide a recommended time frame.  These measures for retrieval are im-
portant and noteworthy, as they provide guidelines for safe removal. 
Notably, the objectives in the ODMSP do not mention the creation 
of new technology to remove existing orbital debris.  The ODMSP’s ob-
jectives merely focus on preventing and reducing the creation of addi-
tional orbital debris by encouraging clever spacecraft designs. Addition-
ally, they do not sufficiently address the threat of already existing orbital 
debris and fail to provide a solution that would entirely eliminate the 
creation of more debris. 
Most importantly, the ODMSP contains a significant flaw.  The 
ODMSP states “[e]ach instance of planned release of debris larger than 
5mm…should be evaluated and justified on the basis of cost effective-
ness and mission requirements.”111  This loophole permits circumvention 
of the ODMSP.  Given the high cost of space technology, companies or 
government agencies hoping to launch satellites and/or spacecrafts into 
outer space can use this loophole to launch poorly designed spacecrafts 
and satellites by justifying their design on the basis of cost effectiveness 
and mission requirements. 
The ODMSP, as a whole, provides a solid framework for regulating 
the design of future space technology.  However, the ODMSP fails to 
address the removal of existing orbit debris and contains loopholes that 
support the creation of structures that may cause more orbital debris so 
long as it can be justified on the basis of costs.  Because space technology 
is costly, there will be several cases that will fall under the exception.   
2. NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris 
NASA, has enacted procedural requirements for limiting orbital de-
bris in a document appropriately titled NASA Procedural Requirements 
for Limiting Orbital Debris and Evaluating the Meteoroid and Orbital 
Debris Environments.112  The NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 
are in accordance with the National Space Policy and the U.S. Govern-
ment Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices mentioned above.113  
The scope of the NPR is limited and applies only to “programs and pro-
jects responsible for NASA or NASA-sponsored objects launched into 
space” so long as “federal authority to oversee the mitigation of orbital 
debris … does not reside with another Federal department or agency.”114  
The NPR does not apply to launch vehicles under the jurisdiction of the 
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Department of Defense—this includes the data sharing agreement men-
tioned below,115 or contributions to the International Space Station.116   
The NPR is intended to implement the guiding policies present in 
the U.S. National Space Policy.117  The NPR articulates the United 
States’ interest in safety and the preservation of the space environment 
by reiterating two guiding policies.118  The first states “[to] [p]reserve 
the space environment… for the purposes of minimizing debris and pre-
serving the space environment for the responsible, peaceful, and safe use 
of all users….” 119  The second states “[to] [f]oster the development of 
space collision warning measures.” 120  The NPR affirms its commitment 
to the United Nations Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines and the 
ODMSP; similarly, the NPR applies only when it is “consistent with 
mission requirements and cost effectiveness.”121  More importantly, the 
NPR reflects the Unites States’ commitment to data sharing.  The NPR 
states its intent to “[d]evelop, maintain, and use space situational aware-
ness information from commercial, civil, and national security sources 
to detect, identify and attribute actions in space that are contrary to re-
sponsible use and the long-term sustainability of the space environ-
ment.”122   
As the amount of orbital debris has continued to grow, data sharing 
agreements between different countries and agencies have become mon-
umentally important.  The NPR tackles this issue by focusing much of 
its efforts on developing space collision warning measures.123  The NPR 
allows several different agencies to collaborate and communicate with 
each other.  The NPR states: 
The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, the Administrator of NASA, and other depart-
ments and agencies, may collaborate with industry and foreign na-
tions to: maintain and improve space object databases; pursue 
common international data standards and data integrity measures; 
and provide services and disseminate orbital tracking information to 
commercial and international entities, including predictions of space 
object conjunction.124   
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It makes sense to pursue collaborations with foreign entities be-
cause outer space concerns a large expansive zone no country has or can 
claim jurisdiction over.  Moreover, all countries with satellites in outer 
space benefit from these collaborations since orbital debris affects all 
nations engaged in space exploration.   
The NPR also assigns NASA the responsibility of approving ex-
ceptions to the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard 
Practices.125  The majority of the NPR deals with exceptions and relief 
from requirements.126 Section 1.3 sets forth the process for requesting 
and granting relief.127  An evaluation for request for relief considers four 
points: 
(1) whether the object at issue poses any additional risks to the public 
and space environment, 
(2) whether the additional risk is acceptable given the importance of 
the mission, 
(3) if the design and operation measures have been applied to a rea-
sonably practicable extent, and 
(4) whether a violation of the Unites States Governmental Orbital 
Debris Mitigation Standard Practices would occur if the relief re-
quested were granted.128   
In determining whether a request for relief will be granted, the NPR 
seems to apply a sort of balance test by weighing the need to approve an 
exception and the possible risks posed by allowing an exception.129  
When a violation of the ODMSP is likely to occur, the Chief may obtain 
the Administrator’s consent to adjudicate the request or may elevate the 
request to the Administrator.130  When a request for relief is elevated, the 
Administrator, along with the Chief and Safety and Mission Assurance, 
make a determination considering applicable National Space Policy with 
regard to human safety and property risk.131  This process may be ap-
pealed by the Mission Directorate Associate Administrator.132 
The remainder of the NPR focuses on the responsible parties 
charged with the task of implementing the NPR in accordance with the 
U.S. mitigation standards.133  For example, the Chief is responsible for 
collecting, developing, promulgating and advising “on procedures, tools, 
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models, methods, and data bases, including characterizations and fore-
casts of the orbital debris and meteoroid environments, to assess and 
mitigate the risk of orbital debris generation, disposal operations, and 
orbital debris and meteoroid impacts.”134  In short, the Chief is given the 
task of collecting the proper data in order to assess the risk of a collision.  
The Orbital Debris Program Office has five principal tasks: 
(1) updating orbital debris environment models to support the 
Chief,135 
(2) conduct measurements of the orbital debris environment and con-
ducts research needed to support the development of the orbital de-
bris environment models,136 
(3) assist NASA project managers in orbital debris assessments by 
providing information and completing evaluations and end of mis-
sion plans,137 
(4) assist the Department of Defense and other U.S. Government De-
partments and organizations in the characterization of the orbital de-
bris environment and the application of mitigation procedures and 
policies,138 and 
(5) to contribute in the determination of whether to adopt interna-
tional orbital debris mitigation guidelines though international fo-
rums.139   
The majority of tasks given to the program are related to data shar-
ing and adoption of mitigation measures.  One of the stated goals of the 
NPR is to “pursue research and development of technologies and tech-
niques” through NASA and the Secretary of Defense, “to mitigate and 
remove on-orbit debris, reduce hazards, and increase understanding of 
the current and future debris environment.”140  Yet, the NPR does not 
assign any entity, provide any guidelines,  requirements, or call for re-
search pertaining to the removal of orbital debris.  The focus is on pre-
vention of future orbital debris and emergency procedures.  Thus, similar 
to the ODMSP, the NPR fails to address the creation of technology 
geared towards the removal of existing orbital debris.  It does nothing to 
encourage innovation and fails to create a department in charge of lead-
ing technology.   
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3. Department of Defense Space Situational Awareness Agreement 
Governmental agencies responsible for space exploration have 
formed data sharing agreements with other governments in order to eval-
uate close approaches of a given satellite with debris.141  The United 
States Department of Defense initiated the Space Situational Awareness 
Agreement (SSAA) to create a surveillance network to track debris.142  
The SSAA’s stated goal is to “promote the responsible, peaceful, and 
safe use of space by fostering cooperative SSA and supporting safe space 
operations through the provision of advanced services and emergency 
notifications.”143  Membership provides access to Space-Track.org, 
which contains historical and current satellite data, decay and re-entry 
data, as well as orbital date request forms all of which are available at no 
cost or obligation.144  Members must participate in a two-way infor-
mation exchange, which involves conjunction assessment, launch sup-
port, deorbit and reentry support, disposal/end-of-life support, collision 
avoidance support, anomaly resolution, and electromagnetic interference 
investigation.145   
The purpose is to provide advanced services to mitigate collision 
risks.146  More importantly, the SSA provides emergency notifications 
and allows countries to collaborate and share information that allows 
space agencies to predict whether orbital debris posing a risk to a space-
craft is threatening enough to warrant an avoidance maneuver.147  The 
importance of the SSA cannot be overstated since the current solution to 
an immediate threat posed by orbital debris is to order a spacecraft to 
perform an avoidance maneuver.148  Avoidance maneuvers are becoming 
more and more frequent.  In October of 2015, Orbital Debris Quarterly 
News, a NASA publication, reported the 24th and 25th collision avoid-
ance maneuver in the history of the International Space Station.149  No-
tably, it was also the 3rd and 4th maneuver performed in 2015.150  While 
moving out of the way seems like a sensible short-term solution, without 
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a long-term plan of attack to address the removal of debris, avoidance 
maneuvers will become more frequent.   
B. International Response to Space Junk 
Currently, the international response to the issue of orbital debris 
has focused on research, data sharing, mitigation procedures, liability, 
and registration of space structures.151  The United Nations (UN) has 
been the guiding force in matters concerning outer space policy and law-
making.152  The UN has set forth space debris mitigation guidelines, lia-
bility procedures for collisions, and registration requirements for all 
structures launched into outer space.153 
1. Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee 
In contrast to the Situational Awareness Agreement, the Inter-
Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) is more re-
search-oriented and focuses on data sharing with an eye towards mitiga-
tion.154 The IADC was established in October 25, 1993 by four govern-
mental agencies NASA (USA), RKA (Russia), Japan, and the European 
Space Agency.155  Since IADC’s inception, membership has grown to 
thirteen countries.156  The primary purpose of the IADC is to “exchange 
information on space debris research activities between member space 
agencies, to facilitate opportunities for cooperation in space debris re-
search, to review the progress of ongoing cooperative activities and to 
identify debris mitigation options.”157  With its emphasis on cooperation, 
the potential for progress sounds promising.  In order to facilitate data 
sharing, the IADC has divided tasks into separate working groups, with 
each group responsible for certain data collection.158 This organized 
structure of data sharing indicates an international desire to use a cohe-
sive committee to address the problem of space debris.  Additionally, 
multilateral cooperation indicates it is possible to come to a solution that 
will not only receive worldwide acceptance and participation, but also 
financial backing necessary to achieve a desired outcome.  The IADC is 
a step in the right direction, but it’s focus is limited and lacks measures 
 
 151. See infra Section IV.B.1-5. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Terms of Reference, INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMMITTEE, 
https://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=torp_pdf. 
 155. Id. at 3. 
 156. Id. at 8. 
 157. Id. at 7. 
 158. Id. at 11.  For example, Group 1 is in charge of measurements.  Id. Group 2 is in 
charge of environment and database. Id. at 12. Group 3 is in charge of protection.  Id. at 13. 
Group 4 is in charge of mitigation.  Id. at 15. 
408 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:59 
that will encourage the innovation of new technology that address the 
removal of existing orbital debris. 
2. Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs has set forth 
guidelines for orbital debris mitigation in the Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(SDMG).159  While outer space law has been around for several decades, 
the United Nations did not address the problem of space debris as a pri-
ority matter until 1994.160  In 1995, a subcommittee was appointed and 
instructed to focus on understanding orbital debris.161  This was an im-
portant moment in the history of international space policy.  Previously, 
the issue of orbital debris was often pushed aside.  By appointing a sub-
committee, the UN authorized and opened the door for research into or-
bital debris.  The subcommittee was instructed to focus on “debris meas-
urement techniques; mathematical modelling of the debris environment; 
characterizing of the space debris environment; and measures to mitigate 
the risks of space debris, including spacecraft design measures to protect 
against space debris.”162  The UN set forth a workplan to cover several 
topics concerning orbital debris each year from 1996-1998.163  Each ses-
sion was to be used to review current “operational debris mitigation prac-
tices and consider future mitigation methods with regard to cost effi-
ciency.”164   
In the following years, these measures led to the preparation, crea-
tion, and adoption of the technical report on space debris.165  The purpose 
of the report was to create an “accumulation of advice and guidance, in 
order to establish a common understanding that could serve as the basis 
for further deliberations” on matters concerning space debris.166  By 
1999, the technical report on space debris was adopted, distributed, and 
made available to the Third United Nations Conference on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space, and the Legal Subcommittee, as well as other in-
ternational organizations and scientific meetings.167  In 2001, the Sub-
committee agreed to establish a work plan that would take place between 
2002 and 2005, with the goal of “expediting international adoption of 
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voluntary debris mitigation measures” and to continue to receive support 
and collaboration from other international organizations to report on re-
search and share data concerning other relevant aspects of space de-
bris.168   
By December of 2007, the General Assembly endorsed the Space 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines.169  These guidelines reflect the existing 
practices developed by other national and international organizations.170  
The hope was to invite other member states to adopt the guidelines 
through their own national mechanisms.171   
There are seven mitigation guidelines set forth by the UN Office 
for Outer Space Affairs.  They are important to understanding the inter-
national approach to orbital debris and the failure to address removal.  
The first guideline seeks to “[l]imit debris released during normal oper-
ations” by designing space structures that do not release debris under 
normal conditions.172  Member states are instructed to minimize the re-
lease of debris.173  The second guideline seeks to “[m]inimize the poten-
tial for break-ups during operational phases” by designing spacecrafts 
that do not fragment when in “failure mode” and planning disposal 
measures when failure is detected in order to avoid fragmentation.174  
The guideline involves planning for potential scenarios in order to re-
duce the probability of a “catastrophic” event.175  The third guideline 
addresses the need to limit the possibility of an accidental collision in 
orbit.176  In developing the design of a spacecraft, “the probability of an 
accidental collision . . . should be estimated and limited.”177  When con-
sidering the design of a space structure, the guidelines recommend that 
the design consider the risks and dangers present throughout all stages 
of a space structure’s life.178  In cases where available data indicates a 
high probability of a potential collision, the guideline states, an adjust-
ment of launch time or avoidance maneuvers should be considered in 
order to reduce the likelihood of a potential collision.179  Collision avoid-
ance is becoming more and more relevant.  Studies show that as “the 
number and mass of space debris increase, the primary source of new 
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space debris is likely to be from collisions.”180  This guideline is signifi-
cant and telling, as it reveals how the international community is choos-
ing to respond to the problem of space debris.  The guideline is limited 
to addressing an emergency situation and only proposes a quick fix to 
address the symptoms of a growing problem.  It does not provide a so-
lution or an approach that is intended to solve the problem itself. 
The fourth guideline seeks to “avoid intentional destruction and 
other harmful activities” by recommending the avoidance of the inten-
tional destruction of “on-orbit spacecrafts and launch vehicle orbital 
stages or other harmful activities that generate long-lived debris.”181  If 
an intentional break-up is necessary, the guideline states it should be 
conducted at “low altitudes” in order to limit the orbital lifetime of the 
resulting debris.182  The fifth guideline addresses the need to “minimize 
potential for post-mission break-up resulting from stored energy” by rec-
ommending the depletion of stored energy.183  Depletion is recom-
mended when there is no longer a purpose for stored energy.184  This 
usually takes place at the end of mission operations and/or after post-
mission disposal.185  This guideline is a preventative measure intended 
to prevent the creation of more orbital debris in outer space, however, it 
does not address removal. 
Guideline six was enacted to “[l]imit the long-term presence of 
spacecraft and launch vehicle stages in the low-Earth orbit (LEO) region 
after the end of their mission” by recommending the removal of non-
operational spacecrafts that pass through the LEO in a “controlled fash-
ion.”186 When removing the spacecraft  from orbit in a controlled fashion 
would be impossible, the guideline recommends disposal in “orbits that 
avoid their long-term presence” in the LEO region.187   
Additionally, when removing an object from LEO the guideline 
recommends giving “due consideration” to the possibility of atmos-
pheric re-entry and the potential risks to human life or property that may 
arise during re-entry.188  This includes the risk of releasing hazardous 
substances into the environment.189  Unlike the ODMSP,190 the SDMG, 
only requires that due consideration be given, but does not define what 
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constitutes an undue risk of harm.  This omission could be problematic.  
Lastly, the seventh guideline seeks to “limit the long-term interference 
of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages with the geosynchronous 
Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their mission” by recommend-
ing that a non-operational spacecraft that passes through the GEO region 
be left in an orbit that avoids long-term interference with the GEO re-
gion.191  This guideline recommends spacecraft disposal take place in an 
orbit above the GEO region because it reduces the potential for future 
collision, the likelihood of interference, and return to the GEO region.192  
As previously mentioned, the problem with using storage orbits as 
dumping sites for orbital debris is that it may preclude any future plans 
to use these orbits in a “more productive manner.”193 
These guidelines set forth above are intended to minimize the quan-
tity of space debris released into orbit.  However, they do not set forth 
any guidelines for removal of existing debris and they fail to incentivize 
the creation of new technology to address removal.  Moreover, the 
SDMG contains several flaws. First, the application of the guidelines 
proposed in the SDMG is entirely voluntary.194  They are not legally 
binding on member states or other countries.195  Thus, the SDMG does 
not carry the weight necessary to encourage countries to abide by the 
guidelines or provide an effective way of enforcing the guidelines.  Sec-
ond, like the ODMSP in the U.S.,196 the SDMG contains loopholes.  Ex-
ceptions may be granted so long as they can be justified.197   
3. The United Nations Outer Space Treaty 
One of the most important developments concerning international 
space law is the UN Treaty198 on “Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies” (hereinafter “Outer Space Treaty”).199  This 
treaty was entered into force on October 10, 1967 with the intention of 
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providing a legal basis for the peaceful use of outer space and a frame-
work for developing law governing outer space.200  The Outer Space 
Treaty sets forth several governing principles that reflect the desire for 
multilateral cooperation.  Three are relevant to addressing orbital debris.  
First, Article I states “exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be 
carried out for the benefit and . . . interest of all countries . . . and shall 
be the province of all mankind.”201  In other words, outer space consti-
tutes an area without jurisdiction that is open and free to all countries, so 
long as their conduct is in accordance with international law.   
Second, Article IV of the treaty prohibits member states from plac-
ing “nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction” 
in orbit around Earth.202  Space exploration is intended to be a neutral 
zone where only “peaceful exploration” is to take place.203  For example, 
the treaty prohibits the establishment of military bases, as well as instal-
lations and fortifications, and testing of any weapons on the moon or 
other celestial bodies, but permits the use of military personnel for sci-
entific research.204   
Third, the treaty addresses liability and authorizes compensation for 
damages to spacecrafts.205  A launching State is “internationally liable” 
for damage caused by all objects launched into outer space.206  Article 
VII, states that “each State Party … is internationally liable for damage 
to another State Party . . . by such object or its component parts. . . .”207  
Thus, member states are responsible for damage caused by their space-
crafts even when they fragment and break off a main structure.208  The 
issue of liability may seem impossible to enforce, given that it may be 
difficult to identify a random piece of space debris, but launching a 
spacecraft into outer space requires a member state to go through a reg-
istration process.209  The Outer Space Treaty sets the groundwork for 
other laws and guidelines.  The concepts in the treaty have been ex-
panded and now govern several activities in outer space.   
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4. United Nations Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects 
The UN Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused 
by Space Objects (hereinafter, The Liability Convention) came into 
force on September 1, 1972.210  The United States was one of the original 
parties to the treaty.211 The treaty is important for two main reasons:  
first, it formally recognized and addressed damages resulting from a 
spacecraft or man-made debris and the need to ratify uniform rules to 
establish liability and payment of damages.212  At the time of its concep-
tion, member states hoped it would result in “the strengthening of inter-
national co-operation in the field of space exploration . . . .”213 Second, 
under the Liability Convention, because member states are held liable 
for damages caused by one of their spacecrafts or from a pieces of space-
craft debris, member states have an interest in solving the problem of 
orbital debris.214   
The Liability Convention sets forth rules that establish liability.  For 
example, Article III states that if a space object is damaged by another 
space object, the latter is liable only if the damage was “due to its fault 
or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible.”215  If an event causing  
destruction  causes further damage to a third space object, the first two 
launching states shall be jointly and severally liable to the third state 
space object.  Liability is based on the fault of either of the first two 
states.216  Moreover, the burden of compensation for damage to the third 
object will be apportioned between the first two states “in accordance 
with the extent to which they are at fault, but if fault cannot be deter-
mined the burden of compensation shall be apportioned equally between 
them.”217  When two states jointly launch a space object, they are both 
jointly and severally liable.218  Even when a state allows another state to 
launch a space object from their territory of facility, the state allowing 
the launch is regarded as a participant in a joint launching.219   
The Liability Convention also sets forth rules for indemnification 
and exoneration. Article V states, a “launching State which has paid 
 
 210. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened 
Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, 188,  https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publica-
tion/UNTS/Volume%20961/volume-961-I-13810-English.pdf [hereinafter Liability Conven-
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compensation for damage shall have the right to present a claim for in-
demnification to other participants in the joint launching.”220  Article VI, 
allows a launching state to be exonerated from absolute liability so long 
as it has not violated any other international laws and the launching state 
can establish that the damage resulted from the claimant State’s (or ju-
ridical persons it represents) gross negligence, or an act or omission done 
with intent to cause damage.221  Moreover, the Conventions sets forth 
the procedural guidelines for presenting a claim for compensation.222  
The claimant has either “one year following the date of the occurrence 
of the damage or [one year following] the identification of the launching 
State [that] is liable” for the damage. 223  This period may be extended to 
one year following the date “the State could reasonably be expected to 
have learned of the facts through the exercise of due diligence.”224  The 
laws in place are flexible and allow the Claimant sufficient time to ad-
dress damages.  For example, the Claimant is permitted to revise the 
claim and submit documentation after the expiration of time-limits until 
one year after the full extent of damage is known.225  Additionally, a 
Claimant does not need to exhaust any local remedies prior to presenting 
a claim.226  Thus, there is a high likelihood that the damage will be dis-
covered and a launching State will be held liable for damages. 
Under the Liability Convention, an aggrieved State may hold the 
launching State liable for all damages incurred.227 The amount of dam-
ages awarded to a Claimant are proportional to the damages caused.228  
The treaty states that a launching State liable for damages must pay com-
pensation sufficient to “restore the person, natural or juridical, State or 
international organization on whose behalf the claim is present to the 
condition which would have existed if the damage had not occurred.”229  
Since damages can potentially be very high,230 the Liability Convention 
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 228. Liability Convention, supra note 210, at 191. 
 229. Id. Amount of damages awarded reflects tort law in the United States. 
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provides an incentive for member states to comply with the mitigation 
guidelines and an interest in creating space debris removal technology.   
The Liability Convention sets forth procedural guidelines in cases 
where settlement negotiations are stalled.  The Convention provides pro-
visions that encourage parties to come to a settlement agreement.231  
When a settlement agreement does not occur within one year from the 
date the launching State is notified of the submitted claim, a Claims 
Commission is formed to address the claim.232  The Commission is com-
posed of three members, one appointed by the Claimant State, one ap-
pointed by the launching State, and a chairman who is chosen by both 
parties.233  The Claims Commission is charged with the task of deciding 
the merits of the claim and determining the amount of compensation 
awarded to the Claimant.234  All decisions and awards of the commission 
are decided by a majority vote.235  Prior to rendering a decision, the par-
ties can agree to a final and binding decision, or the Commission will 
render a final and recommendatory award, which the parties are expected 
to comply with in good faith.236  These procedures ensure that claims 
will be addressed and prevents matters from being left unresolved.   
Notably, the Liability Convention addresses two important scenar-
ios.  First, it considers rapid assistance during an emergency.  It sets forth 
emergency measures in cases where the damage presents a “large scale 
danger to human life or seriously interferes with the living conditions of 
the population . . . .”237  In these cases, rapid assistance to the State that 
has suffered damage is considered by the UN.238  Second, it has safe-
guards in place to prevent a member state from fleeing liability after 
causing damages.239  A member state cannot withdraw without notice.240  
After giving notice of withdrawal, the withdrawal does not take effect 
until one year after giving notice of withdrawal.241  By holding member 
states financially responsible for damage to other crafts, the Liability 
Convention has the likely effect of encouraging  member states to adopt 
mitigation procedures in order to decrease their liability risk and in-
creases the probability that member states will be open to participating 
in agreements addressing space debris removal.  While the Liability 
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Convention has the likely effect of encouraging compliance with miti-
gation guidelines and procedures, it does not contain any provisions re-
quiring removal of existing orbital debris or creation of new technologies 
addressing orbital debris removal.  It falls short of providing a complete 
solution. 
5. United Nations Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space 
The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space (hereinafter, the Registration Convention) was carried into force 
with the same philosophy and desire for multilateral cooperation cham-
pioned by the Outer Space Treaty.242  The purpose of the  Registration 
Convention was to establish and maintain a “central register of objects 
launched into outer space.”243  According to Article IV, which sets forth 
the registry requirements, the launching State must register a space ob-
ject by forwarding the following information to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations: (1) name of launching State(s), (2) the space objects 
registration number or a comparable designator, (3) the location, terri-
tory, and date of launch, (4) orbital parameters, and (5) the general func-
tion of the space object.244 
Registration is useful for several reasons.  Notably, it simplifies the 
identification of a spacecraft for liability purposes.  The articles in the 
Registration Convention reveal a strong commitment to enforcing the 
Liability Convention.  In cases where identification of a space object is 
not possible, member states “possessing space monitoring and tracking 
facilities” must respond to “the greatest extent feasible” to a request from 
a member state who has suffered damages and assist in the identification 
of the space object that caused damages.245  While the Registration Con-
vention does not address the removal of orbital debris, it does create an 
incentive for member states to comply with mitigation procedures in or-
der to minimize their risk of liability.  By requiring countries to register 
their spacecrafts and satellites, the Registration Convention helps iden-
tify the liable party.  By raising the likelihood that a liable party will be 
caught, the Registration Convention provides an incentive for member 
states to invest or create orbital debris removal technology. 
 
 242. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, approved Nov. 
12, 1974, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publica-
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V. PROPOSAL 
Unfortunately, neither national nor international space law contains 
solutions to the space debris problem.  Current measures have focused 
on mitigation and do not address removal of existing debris.  Since na-
tional and international efforts have not been fruitful in inventing space 
debris removal technology, the task of creating such technology should 
be left to the world’s brightest individuals.  Thus, a solution will involve 
policies that encourage and incentivize innovation in space technology 
in a manner that expands participation beyond national and international 
organizations.   
Lack of funding is one of the major road blocks for companies try-
ing to solve the space junk problem.  Recently, D-Orbit, the Italian space 
company responsible for creating D-Sat, resorted to crowdfunding on 
Kickstarter246 to raise €25,000 in order to test D-Sat.247  Their efforts on 
Kickstarter failed; they only raised €12,328 and had 166 backers.248  
While D-Orbit eventually funded the project and launched D-Sat on June 
23, 2017,249 their attempt at crowdfunding reflects the financial chal-
lenges faced by companies attempting to solve the space debris problem.  
Because of exorbitant costs, when it comes creating solutions for space 
debris, the lack of funding stifles innovation and prevents innovators 
from venturing into the realm of space technology.  Conceptually, D-Sat 
sounds very promising.  The satellite is attached with a decommissioning 
device, referred to as D3, that takes the device out of orbit at the end of 
the satellite’s life.250  However, it is not surprising that crowdfunding 
would fail.  Space debris is not a concern for most people.  It does not 
have the same appeal and draw of a humanitarian cause, but it is never-
theless important. 
In order to solve the space debris problem, the solution must con-
sider the costs of creating technology and create an incentive to encour-
age innovation.  Current treaties and international laws do not address 
the need to encourage and incentivize the creation of technology capable 
of addressing the space debris problem.251  A solution that financially 
 
 246. See About Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/about (“Kick-
starter helps artists, musicians, filmakers, designers, and other creators find the resources and 
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supports innovation and technological advancements in space explora-
tion technologies by rewarding innovators would be the best path to-
wards solving the space junk problem.  A solution can be found in mar-
itime law of salvage.252  The application of maritime salvage law to outer 
space can provide a solution that addresses both the cost of creating 
space technology and the need to incentivize innovators to create space 
technology aimed specifically at removing orbital debris.   
A. Maritime Law of Salvage 
Maritime law and space law have often been compared to one an-
other because of the inherent similarities between space and oceans.253  
Since the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982, laws governing the high 
seas have been ratified with the goal of establishing “the notion of the 
common heritage of mankind as a guiding principle for regulating the 
use of global commons.”254  The same ideals are reflected in data-sharing 
agreements and UN treaties pertaining to outer space.255  Since no single 
country has jurisdiction over outer space or the sea, they are mainly gov-
erned by international treaties.256  Historically, the law of salvage “gov-
erns the voluntary and successful rescue of property that is lost at sea or 
is in some sort of marine peril.”257  Under maritime law of salvage, the 
salvor,258 who retrieves the lost property, is entitled to a reward for per-
formance.259   
The 1986 International Convention on Salvage was entered into 
force on July 1, 1996.260  Case law in the United States indicates the 
treaty set forth in the Salvage Convention determines the outcome of 
salvage claims.261  Traditionally, the law of salvage required a salvor to 
 
 252. The idea of using maritime law of salvage to encourage innovation in space junk 
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 253. See Gabrielle Hollingsworth, Space Junk: Why the United Nations Must Step in to 
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successfully retrieve a ship or cargo in order to receive compensation, 
but more recently, in the 1989 Salvage Convention (hereinafter, Salvage 
Convention) there was an exception in cases where the salvor performs 
a service that saves the environment.262  Because of the current threat 
space debris poses to outer space, the retrieval or removal of space debris 
from orbit would fall under this exception.263  Prior to the 1989 Conven-
tion, the amount rewarded was limited to the value of the vessel that is 
recovered.264  The Convention added provisions to provide special com-
pensation to include out of pocket expenses accrued by the salvor.265  
Similarly, these provisions can be applied to encourage space technology 
by providing special compensation to inventors.  This solution will take 
into consideration the out of pocket costs accrued throughout the process 
of creating space technology.   
Under the Salvage Convention, the amount of financial compensa-
tion awarded to a salvor depends on certain factors.266  The amount re-
warded to a salvor is determined with the intent to encourage salvage 
operations.267  As applied to the creation of space technology and the 
recovery of space junk, the amount awarded must be such that would 
encourage innovation and make it worthwhile to expend the time and 
resources necessary.  Traditionally, the amount rewarded considers the 
value of the vessel or property salvaged.268  A reward also takes into 
consideration the skill and effort in preventing or minimizing damage to 
the environment.269  As applied to the context of space law, the amount 
rewarded must consider the value of the debris retrieved and the skill and 
effort taken to create space technology.  The reward-for-recovery mech-
anism present in salvage law should be applied as long as the new tech-
nology makes a genuine attempt to remove space debris from orbit and 
does not itself create more debris; an example being the innovation of 
decommissioning devices such as D-Orbit’s D3.270  Notably, the Salvage 
Convention considers promptness of the services rendered.271  Given the 
current high levels of space debris and plans to launch more satellites 
into outer space, an appropriate solution may reward those who are the 
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first to pioneer space technologies addressing space junk more gener-
ously than those that follow.  This would motivate powerhouse tech 
companies like Space X to use their current skills and technologies to 
address this problem.  By providing rewards, the greatest and brightest 
individuals will have an incentive to come up with innovative solutions 
for modern day problems.   
Innovators, like Elon Musk, have shown interest in space technol-
ogy.  In 2002 Elon Musk founded SpaceX.272  Recent advancements in-
dicate SpaceX may be capable of providing cost-effective solutions to 
solve the issue of orbital debris.  The space company is currently the 
“only private company ever to return a spacecraft from low-Earth or-
bit.”273  SpaceX’s dedication to creating cost effective reusable space 
technology and their demonstrated ability to create spacecrafts capable 
of returning from orbit, including rockets capable of re-flight, indicates 
that a solution may be on the horizon.274 The problem lies in the fact that 
space companies currently have no financial incentive to spend money 
creating space debris removal technology.  In the overall vastness of 
outer space, the problem of orbital debris is easily ignored.   
The application of maritime law of salvage in this context would 
need to involve international cooperation and responsibility over the 
space debris problem.  The best approach would involve the ratification 
of a UN treaty that adopts a modified version of the principles set forth 
in the Salvage Convention and creates a budget to address space debris 
removal technology.  This approach does not advocate for the use of 
government contracts between government agencies and private space 
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companies for the purpose of removing or destroying orbital debris,275  
such an approach would stifle innovation by limiting funding and the 
creation of technology to a single company.  Additionally, if the past is 
any indication of the future, governments are simply not interested in 
providing funding for the sole purpose of developing orbital debris re-
moval technology.  The objective is to encourage the world’s best engi-
neers to invent space technology and innovative solutions to real modern 
problems.  By awarding funding to a single company, government con-
tracts tend to limit the number of inventors working on a particular prob-
lem, thus, lessening the chance of creating the best solution.  While this 
solution involves a certain level of privatization and subjects what has 
been a government function to the free market, it is a solution worth ex-
ploring.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
National and international policies addressing the problem of or-
bital debris all suffer the same defect.  Current responses focus on debris 
mitigation and emergency responses to immediate threats, but they fail 
to address the removal of existing orbital debris.  Since mitigation pro-
cedures only minimize debris and do not entirely eliminate it, space ex-
ploration will continue to create more debris.  In absence of national and 
international policies addressing the removal of debris, the amount of 
debris in orbit will continue to grow.  In the best-case scenario, without 
an approach to remove debris, space exploration will one day be hin-
dered by the amount of man-made space junk in orbit.  It is possible that 
in the future, space travel will be entirely off the table because of space 
debris.  Astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tyson said it best, “[w]e may be 
putting so much debris in space, that we will close ourselves off from 
space travel because of the dangers it would take to get through our own 
garbage heap.”276  In the worst-case scenario, space debris will threaten 
human lives and property. 
One solution is to adopt an approach that encourages innovation.  
This is where maritime law of salvage comes in.  In practice, the law of 
salvage encourages the retrieval and return of property lost at sea by re-
warding performance.277  In the context of space debris, the same reward 
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system can be applied in order to create a financial incentive for the bril-
liant minds of this world to participate in finding a solution to orbital 
debris.   
By creating a reward system that compensates innovators for their 
contributions, the law of salvage will encourage and incentivize innova-
tion in a way current policies do not.  Space companies like SpaceX have 
been developing new space technologies fairly rapidly.278  A financial 
incentive will go a long way in directing their focus to solving the prob-
lem of orbital debris.  The urgency of finding viable solutions to the 
space debris problem cannot be overstated.  As of August 2018, a total 
of approximately 8,126 objects have been launched into outer space, 
twenty-two percent of these objects have been launched into space 
within the last eight years.279  In 2017 alone, 453 objects were launched 
into outer space.280  As the number of satellites launched into space con-
tinues to increase, the space debris problem will continue to exacerbate.  
The increased interest in the development of space technology is likely 
to attract inventors capable of developing space debris removal technol-
ogy. The only thing missing is a financial incentive to help fund this 
altruistic endeavor.  The application of maritime law of salvage to outer 
space law is an option worth exploring. 
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